Benchmarking the quantum cryptanalysis of symmetric, public-key and
  hash-based cryptographic schemes by Gheorghiu, Vlad & Mosca, Michele
Benchmarking the quantum cryptanalysis of symmetric, public-key and hash-based cryptographic
schemes
Vlad Gheorghiu1, 2, 3, 4, ∗ and Michele Mosca1, 2, 5, 6, 3, 4, †
1Institute for Quantum Computing, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, N2L 3G1, Canada
2Department of Combinatorics & Optimization, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, N2L 3G1, Canada
3evolutionQ Inc., Waterloo, ON, Canada
4softwareQ Inc., Kitchener, ON, Canada
5Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics, Waterloo, ON, N2L 6B9, Canada
6Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, Toronto, ON, M5G 1Z8, Canada
Quantum algorithms can break factoring and discrete logarithm based cryptography and weaken symmetric
cryptography and hash functions.
In order to estimate the real-world impact of these attacks, apart from tracking the development of fault-
tolerant quantum computers it is important to have an estimate of the resources needed to implement these
quantum attacks.
For attacking symmetric cryptography and hash functions, generic quantum attacks are substantially less
powerful than they are for today’s public-key cryptography. So security will degrade gradually as quantum
computing resources increase. At present, there is a substantial resource overhead due to the cost of fault-tolerant
quantum error correction. We provide estimates of this overhead using state-of-the-art methods in quantum
fault-tolerance. For example, recent lattice surgery methods reduced memory costs by roughly a factor of 5 over
previous methods. Future advances in fault-tolerance and in the quality of quantum hardware may reduce this
overhead further. Another part of the cost of implementing generic quantum attacks is the cost of implementing
the cryptographic functions. We use state-of-the-art optimized circuits, though further improvements in their
implementation would also reduce the resources needed to implement these attacks. To bound the potential
impact of further circuit optimizations we provide cost estimates assuming trivial-cost implementations of these
functions. These figures indicate the effective bit-strength of the various symmetric schemes and hash functions
based on what we know today (and with various assumptions on the quantum hardware), and frame the various
potential improvements that should continue to be tracked. As an example, we also look at the implications for
Bitcoin’s proof-of-work system.
For many of the currently used asymmetric (public-key) cryptographic schemes based on RSA and elliptic
curve discrete logarithms, we again provide cost estimates based on the latest advances in cryptanalysis, circuit
compilation and quantum fault-tolerance theory. These allow, for example, a direct comparison of the quantum
vulnerability of RSA and elliptic curve cryptography for a fixed classical bit strength.
This analysis provides state-of-the art snap-shot estimates of the realistic costs of implementing quantum
attacks on these important cryptographic algorithms, assuming quantum fault-tolerance is achieved using surface
code methods, and spanning a range of potential error rates. These estimates serve as a guide for gauging the
realistic impact of these algorithms and for benchmarking the impact of future advances in quantum algorithms,
circuit synthesis and optimization, fault-tolerance methods and physical error rates.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Symmetric, public-key (asymmetric) and hash-based cryp-
tography constitute a fundamental pillar of modern cryptog-
raphy. Symmetric cryptography includes symmetric-key en-
cryption, where a shared secret key is used for both encryp-
tion and decryption. Cryptographic hash functions map arbi-
trarily long strings to strings of a fixed finite length. Currently
deployed public-key schemes are used to establish a common
secret key between two remote parties. They are based on fac-
toring large numbers or solving the discrete logarithm prob-
lem over a finite group. For more details about modern cryp-
tography the interested reader can consult one of the many
excellent references on the topic, e.g. [1].
In contrast to asymmetric schemes based on factoring or
solving the discrete logarithm problem and which are com-
pletely broken by a quantum adversary via Shor’s algo-
rithm [2], symmetric schemes and hash functions are less
vulnerable to quantum attacks. The best known quantum at-
tacks against them are based on Grover’s quantum search al-
gorithm [3], which offers a quadratic speedup compared to
classical brute force searching. Given a search space of size
N , Grover’s algorithm finds, with high probability, an element
x for which a certain property such as f(x) = 1 holds, for
some function f we know how to evaluate (assuming such a
solution exists). The algorithm evaluates f a total of O(√N)
times. It applies a simple operation in between the evaluations
of f , so the O(√N) evaluations of f account for most of the
complexity. In contrast, any classical algorithm that evaluates
f in a similar “black-box” way requires on the order of N
evaluations of f to find such an element.
Any quantum algorithm can be mapped to a quantum cir-
cuit, which can be implemented on a quantum computer. The
quantum circuit represents what we call the “logical layer”.
Such a circuit can always be decomposed in a sequence of
“elementary gates”, such as Clifford gates (CNOT, Hadamard
etc. [4]) augmented by a non-Clifford gate such as the T gate.
Running a logical circuit on a full fault-tolerant quantum
computer is highly non-trivial. The sequence of logical gates
have to be mapped to sequences of surface code measurement
cycles (see e.g. [5] for extensive details). By far, the most
resource-consuming (in terms of number of qubits required
and time) is the T gate1. In comparison with surface code
1 Clifford gates are “cheap”, i.e. they require relatively small overhead for
implementation in the surface code, but are not universals, hence a non-
defects and braiding techniques [5], novel lattice surgery tech-
niques [6, 8, 9] reduce the spatial overhead required for imple-
menting T gates via magic state distillation by approximately
a factor of 5, while also modestly improving the running time.
In this paper we first analyze the security of symmetric
schemes and hash functions against large-scale fault-tolerant
quantum adversaries, using surface code defects and braiding
techniques. We take into account the time-space trade-offs
with parallelizing quantum search, down to the fault-tolerant
layer. Naively, one might hope that K quantum computers (or
quantum “processors”, as we will call them later in the paper)
running in parallel reduce the number the circuit depth down
to O(√N)/K steps, similar to the classical case of distribut-
ing a search space across K classical processors. However
quantum searching does not parallelize so well, and the re-
quired number of steps for parallel quantum searching is of
the orderO(√N/K) [10]. This is a factor of√K larger than
O(√N)/K . As shown in [10], the optimal way of doing par-
allel quantum search is to partition the search space intoN/K
parts, and to perform independent quantum searches on each
part.
Secondly, we investigate the security of public-key crypto-
graphic schemes such as RSA and ECC against quantum at-
tacks, using the latest developments in theory of fault-tolerant
quantum error correction, i.e. novel lattice surgery tech-
niques [6, 8, 9].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Sec. II, we provide an overview of the methodology used in
our analysis. In Sec. III we investigate the security of the AES
family of modern symmetric ciphers. In Sec. IV we analyze
the security of the SHA family of hash functions. In Sec. V we
investigate the security of Bitcoin’s [11] proof-of-work con-
sensus mechanism. We conclude our investigation of symmet-
ric and hash-based cryptographic schemes in Sec. VI, where
we evaluate the intrinsic cost of running the Grover algorithm
with a trivial oracle (i.e., an oracle with a unit cost of 1 for
each invocation).
In the subsequent sections we analyze public-key crypto-
graphic schemes. In Sec. VII and Sec. VIII we examine
the most common public-key establishment schemes, such as
RSA and ECC, respectively. In the subsequent sections we
analyze public-key cryptographic schemes. In Sec. VII and
Sec. VIII we examine the most common public-key establish-
ment schemes, such as RSA and ECC, respectively. Finally
we summarize our findings and conclude in Sec. IX.
Clifford gate is required. One such gate is the T gate. There are other
possible choices, however all of the non-Clifford gates require special tech-
niques such as magic state distillation [6, 7] and significant overhead (order
of magnitudes higher than Clifford gates) to be implemented in the surface
code. In fact, to a first order approximation, for the purpose of resource
estimation, one can simply ignore the overhead introduced by the Clifford
gates and simply focus only on the T gates.
3II. METHODOLOGY
A. Symmetric cryptography and hash functions
The methodology, sketched in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, follows the
same lines as the one described in great detail in our earlier
paper [12], which we refer the interested reader to for more
details.
Run Grover's algorithm
Generate and optimize reversible circuits
Classical query model
Logical layer
Embed reversible circuits into error
correcting codes; estimate resources.
Fault tolerant layer
Determine physical resources (time, 
qubits, code cycles).
Physical layer
FIG. 1. Analyzing an attack against a symmetric cryptographic func-
tion with a fault-tolerant quantum adversary. Our resource estima-
tion methodology takes into account several of the layers between
the high level description of an algorithm and the physical hardware
required for its execution. Our approach is modular should assump-
tions about any of these layers change, and hence it allows one to
calculate the impact of improvements in any particular layer.
We assume a surface-code based fault-tolerant architec-
ture [5], using Reed-Muller distillation schemes [13]. For
each scheme we vary the possible physical error rates per gate
from 10−4 to 10−7. We believe that this range of physical
error rates is wide enough to cover both first generation quan-
tum computers as well as more advanced future machines. In
comparison to surface code defects and braiding methods [5],
lattice surgery techniques [6, 8, 9] mostly impact the physical
footprint of the fault-tolerant layer required to run a specific
quantum algorithm, reducing the distillation overhead by ap-
proximately a factor of 5. The temporal overhead (i.e. the
number of surface code cycles) is reduced less drastically. For
this reason, lattice surgery has less significant effects in esti-
mating the security of symmetric schemes or hash functions,
FIG. 2. Grover searching with an oracle for f : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k.
The algorithm makes bpi
4
2N/2c calls to G, the Grover iteration, or,
if parallelized on K processors, bpi
4
2N/(2K)c calls to G. The Grover
iteration has two subroutines. The first, Ug , implements the predicate
g : {0, 1}k → {0, 1} that maps x to 1 if and only if f(x) = y. Each
call to Ug involves two calls to a reversible implementation of f and
one call to a comparison circuit that checks whether f(x) = y.
reducing the security parameter2 by at most 1 and decreasing
the spatial overhead by at most a factor of 5. Therefore when
estimating the security of symmetric and hash-based crypto-
graphic schemes we use surface code defects and braiding
techniques.
For each cryptographic primitive, we display four plots, in
the following order:
1. We plot the total number of surface code cycles per
CPU (where a CPU is a quantum computer capable of
executing a single instance of Grover’s quantum search
algorithm) as a function of the number of CPUs. We
directly tie the quantum security parameter to the to-
tal number of surface code cycles (see [12] for more
details). We also add to the plot the theoretical lower
bound achievable by quantum search in the cases of:
a) considering the oracle a black box of unit cost (lower
line), and b) considering the oracle as composed of ideal
quantum gates, each of unit cost (upper line). Note that
the difference between b) and a) represents the intrin-
sic cost of logical overhead (i.e. the overhead intro-
duced by treating the oracle as a logical circuit and not
a blackbox), whereas the difference between the upper
lines and b) represents the intrinsic cost introduced by
the fault-tolerant layer.
2. We plot the total wall-time per CPU (i.e. how long will
2 The security parameter is defined as the logarithm base two of the number
of fundamental operations (in our case surface code cycles) required to
break the scheme.
4the whole computation take on a parallel quantum ar-
chitecture) as a function of the number of CPUs. The
horizontal dashed line represents the one-year time line,
i.e. the x coordinate of the intersection point between
the “Total time per CPU” line and the one-year time line
provides the number of processors required to break the
system within one year (in log2 units).
3. We plot the total physical footprint (number of qubits)
per CPU, as a function of the number of CPUs.
4. Finally we plot the total physical footprint (number of
qubits) of all quantum search machines (CPUs) running
in parallel.
In the following sections we proceed to analyze symmetric
ciphers (AES, Sec. III), hash functions (SHA-256, SHA3-256,
Sec. IV, Bitcoin’s hash function, Sec. V), and finally the min-
imal resources required for running Grover’s algorithm with
a trivial oracle VI (e.g. the identity gate) on search spaces of
various sizes.
Note that in some ranges of the plots from sec-
tions III, IV, VI and V the total physical footprint increases
slightly with the number of processors, which may seem
counter-intuitive. This happens due to the fact that with more
processors the required code distances decrease, and in some
instances one can pipeline more magic states factories in par-
allel into the surface code, which in effect causes an increase
in the overall physical footprint. Note that the total time per
CPU is monotonically decreasing, as parallelizing distilleries
does not increase the wall time. For more details see [12].
B. Public-key cryptography
Most of the recent progress in quantum cryptanalysis is re-
lated to the fault-tolerant layer in Fig. 1. New methods and
techniques based on surface code lattice surgery [6, 8, 9] al-
low a significant decrease of the overall footprint (number of
qubits, or space) taken by the quantum computation, and also
a relatively modest decrease in time, in comparison with meth-
ods based on surface code defects and braiding [5, 13].
We consider the best up-to-date optimized logical quantum
circuits for attacking RSA and ECC public-key schemes [14–
17] then perform a physical footprint resource estimation
analysis using lattice surgery techniques. We remark that the
overall time required to run the algorithm depends on the level
of parallelization for the magic state factories3.
For each public-key cryptogrpric scheme, we analyze the
space/time tradeoffs and plot the results on a double logarith-
mic scale. We fit the data using a third degree polynomial4
3 Every T gate in the circuit must be implemented by a specialized magic
state factory, each of which occupies a significant physical footprint. One
can implement more magic states in parallel if one is willing to increase
the physical footprint of the computation.
4 A third degree polynomial fits the data very precisely, providing a coeffi-
cient of determination R2 greater than 0.997.
and obtain an analytical closed-form formula for the relation
between the time and the number of qubits required to attack
the scheme, in the form
y(x) = αx3 + βx2 + γx+ δ, (1)
where y represents logarithm base 2 of the number of qubits
and x represents the logarithm base 2 of the time (in seconds).
For example, the quantity
y (log2(24× 3600)) ≈ y(16.3987) (2)
represents how many qubits are required to break the scheme
in one day (24 hours) for a fixed physical error rate per gate
pg , assuming a surface code cycle time of 200ns. Note that the
computation time scales linearly with the surface code cycle
time, e.g. a 1000ns surface code cycle time will result in a
computation that is 5 times longer than a 200ns surface code
cycle time. Therefore, for a specific cryptographic scheme for
which we plotted the space/time tradeoffs using a surface code
cycle time of 200ns and a fixed physical error rate per gate pg ,
the number of qubits required to break a specific scheme in a
time t using an alternative surface code cycle time tc is given
by
y
(
log2
(
200ns
tc
t
))
, (3)
where t is expressed in seconds and tc is expressed in nanosec-
onds.
We assume a surface code cycle time of 200ns, in confor-
mance with [5]. For each scheme we analyze, we compare its
security using the more conservative (and realistic in the short
term) pg = 10−3 and also the more optimistic pg = 10−5.
Note that assuming the more optimistic assumption from a
quantum computing perspective is the more conservative as-
sumption from a cybersecurity perspective.
Furthermore, in this analysis, we are reporting the full phys-
ical footprint, including the memory required for magic state
distillation. Using present-day techniques, the memory re-
quired for generating these generic input states accounts for
a substantial fraction of the total memory cost and thus we
are including these in the total cost estimate and will track the
impact of improved methods.
III. SYMMETRIC CIPHERS
Below we analyze the security of AES family of symmet-
ric ciphers against large-scale fault-tolerant quantum adver-
saries. We used the highly optimized logical circuits produced
in [18].
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FIG. 3. AES-128 block cipher. Required surface clock cycles per
processor, as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale).
The bottom brown line (theoretical lower bound, black box) repre-
sents the minimal number of queries required by Grover’s algorithm,
the cost function being the total number of queries to a black-box
oracle, each query assumed to have unit cost, and a completely error-
free circuit. The purple line (ideal grover, non-black-box) takes into
consideration the structure of the oracle, the cost function being the
total number of gates in the circuit, each gate having unit cost; the
quantum circuit is assumed error-free as well. Both brown and ma-
genta lines are displayed only for comparisons; for both of them, the
y axis should be interpreted as number of logical queries (operations,
respectively). The curves above the purple line show the overhead in-
troduced by fault tolerance (in terms of required surface code cycles,
each surface code cycle assumed to have unit cost). More optimiza-
tion at the logical layer will shift the purple line down, whereas more
optimization at the fault-tolerant layer will move the upper curves
closer to the purple line. Similar remarks to the above hold for the
remaining plots in this manuscript.
For example, the plots in Fig. 3 tells us that if we have 250
quantum computers running Grover’s algorithm in parallel,
with no physical errors, then it would take about 263 gate calls
(where the purple line intersects the vertical line at 50), where
we assume each gate to have unit cost. Still with no errors, a
trivial cost for implementing the cryptographic function (ora-
cle) would bring the cost down to about 238 oracle calls per
quantum computer. Keeping the actual function implementa-
tion, but adding the fault-tolerant layer with a physical error
rate of 10−7 (with appropriate assumptions and using state-
of-the-art quantum error correction) pushes the cost up to
around 276 surface code cycles per quantum computer (where
now each code cycle is assumed to have unit cost). Simi-
lar remarks hold for the remaining plots in this manuscript.
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FIG. 4. AES-128 block cipher. Required time per processor, as a
function of the number of processors (log2 scale). The horizontal
dotted line indicates one year. The x-axis is deliberately extended
to show the necessary number of CPUs for a total time of one year.
Thus the figure shows that it would take, with the stated assump-
tions, over 280 parallel quantum searches to break AES-128 in a
year. Similar remarks to the above hold for the remaining plots in
this manuscript.
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FIG. 5. AES-128 block cipher. Physical footprint (physical qubits)
per processor, as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 6. AES-128 block cipher. Total physical footprint (physical
qubits), as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale). Note
that the qubits are not correlated across processors.
6B. AES-192
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FIG. 7. AES-192 block cipher. Required surface clock cycles per
processor, as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 8. AES-192 block cipher. Required time per processor, as a
function of the number of processors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 9. AES-192 block cipher. Physical footprint (physical qubits)
per processor, as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 10. AES-192 block cipher. Total physical footprint (physical
qubits), as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale). Note
that the qubits are not correlated across processors.
C. AES-256
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FIG. 11. AES-256 block cipher. Required surface clock cycles per
processor, as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 12. AES-256 block cipher. Required time per processor, as a
function of the number of processors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 13. AES-256 block cipher. Physical footprint (physical qubits)
per processor, as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 14. AES-256 block cipher. Total physical footprint (physical
qubits), as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale). Note
that the qubits are not correlated across processors.
IV. HASH FUNCTIONS
In this section we study the effect of parallelized Grover
attacks on the SHA-256 [19] snd SHA3-256 [20] family of
hash functions. We used the highly optimized logical circuits
produced in [12].
A. SHA-256
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FIG. 15. SHA-256 cryptographic hash function. Required surface
clock cycles per processor, as a function of the number of processors
(log2 scale).
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FIG. 16. SHA-256 cryptographic hash function. Required time per
processor, as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 17. SHA-256 cryptographic hash function. Physical footprint
(physical qubits) per processor, as a function of the number of pro-
cessors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 18. SHA-256 cryptographic hash function. Total physical foot-
print (physical qubits), as a function of the number of processors
(log2 scale). Note that the qubits are not correlated across proces-
sors.
B. SHA3-256
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FIG. 19. SHA3-256 cryptographic hash function. Required surface
clock cycles per processor, as a function of the number of processors
(log2 scale).
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FIG. 20. SHA3-256 cryptographic hash function. Required time per
processor, as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 21. SHA3-256 cryptographic hash function. Physical footprint
(physical qubits) per processor, as a function of the number of pro-
cessors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 22. SHA3-256 cryptographic hash function. Total physical
footprint (physical qubits), as a function of the number of processors
(log2 scale). Note that the qubits are not correlated across processors.
V. BITCOIN
In this section we analyze the security of Bitcoin’s [11]
proof-of-work protocol, which is based on finding a hash5
pre-image which that starts with a certain number of zeros.
The latter is dynamically adjusted by the protocol so that
the problem is on average solved by the whole network in
10 minutes. Currently, it takes around 275 classical hash-
ing operations [21] for finding a desired hash pre-image suc-
cessfully via brute-force search with specialized hardware.
5 The hash function being used by the protocol is H(x) := SHA-256(SHA-
256(x).
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FIG. 23. Bitcoin’s cryptographic hash function H(x) := SHA-
256(SHA-256(x)). Required surface clock cycles per processor, as a
function of the number of processors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 24. Bitcoin’s cryptographic hash function H(x) := SHA-
256(SHA-256(x)). Required time per processor, as a function of the
number of processors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 25. Bitcoin’s cryptographic hash function H(x) := SHA-
256(SHA-256(x)). Physical footprint (physical qubits) per proces-
sor, as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 26. Bitcoin’s cryptographic hash function H(x) := SHA-
256(SHA-256(x)). Total physical footprint (physical qubits), as a
function of the number of processors (log2 scale). Note that the
qubits are not correlated across processors.
VI. INTRINSIC COST OF PARALLELIZED GROVER’S
ALGORITHM
More efficient quantum implementations of AES and SHA
imply more efficient cryptanalysis. In this section, we aim to
bound how much further optimized implementations of these
cryptographic functions could help. We do so by assuming a
trivial cost of 1 for each function evaluation.
A. Searching space of size 256
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FIG. 27. Running Grover’s algorithm with a trivial oracle, for a
searching space of size 256. Required surface clock cycles per pro-
cessor, as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 28. Running Grover’s algorithm with a trivial oracle, for a
searching space of size 256. Required time per processor, as a func-
tion of the number of processors (log2 scale). The dotted horizontal
line indicates one year.
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FIG. 29. Running Grover’s algorithm with a trivial oracle, for a
searching space of size 256. Physical footprint (physical qubits) per
processor, as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 30. Running Grover’s algorithm with a trivial oracle, for
a searching space of size 256. Total physical footprint (physical
qubits), as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale). Note
that the qubits are not correlated across processors.
B. Searching space of size 264
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FIG. 31. Running Grover’s algorithm with a trivial oracle, for a
searching space of size 264. Required surface clock cycles per pro-
cessor, as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 32. Running Grover’s algorithm with a trivial oracle, for a
searching space of size 264. Required time per processor, as a func-
tion of the number of processors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 33. Running Grover’s algorithm with a trivial oracle, for a
searching space of size 264. Physical footprint (physical qubits) per
processor, as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 34. Running Grover’s algorithm with a trivial oracle, for
a searching space of size 264. Total physical footprint (physical
qubits), as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale). Note
that the qubits are not correlated across processors.
C. Searching space of size 2128
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FIG. 35. Running Grover’s algorithm with a trivial oracle, for a
searching space of size 2128. Required surface clock cycles per pro-
cessor, as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale).
0 20 40 60 80 100
CPUs (log2)
0
10
20
30
40
50
To
ta
l t
im
e 
pe
r C
PU
 (s
ec
on
ds
, l
og
2)
Minimal Grover 128 bits
p_g=1e-4
p_g=1e-5
p_g=1e-6
p_g=1e-7
1 year
FIG. 36. Running Grover’s algorithm with a trivial oracle, for a
searching space of size 2128. Required time per processor, as a func-
tion of the number of processors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 37. Running Grover’s algorithm with a trivial oracle, for a
searching space of size 2128. Physical footprint (physical qubits) per
processor, as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 38. Running Grover’s algorithm with a trivial oracle, for a
searching space of size 2128. Total physical footprint (physical
qubits), as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale). Note
that the qubits are not correlated across processors.
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D. Searching space of size 2256
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FIG. 39. Running Grover’s algorithm with a trivial oracle, for a
searching space of size 2256. Required surface clock cycles per pro-
cessor, as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 40. Running Grover’s algorithm with a trivial oracle, for a
searching space of size 2256. Required time per processor, as a func-
tion of the number of processors (log2 scale).
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
CPUs (log2)
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
To
ta
l p
hy
sic
al
 fo
ot
pr
in
t p
er
 C
PU
1e8 Minimal Grover 256 bits
p_g=1e-4
p_g=1e-5
p_g=1e-6
p_g=1e-7
FIG. 41. Running Grover’s algorithm with a trivial oracle, for a
searching space of size 2256. Physical footprint (physical qubits) per
processor, as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale).
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FIG. 42. Running Grover’s algorithm with a trivial oracle, for a
searching space of size 2256. Total physical footprint (physical
qubits), as a function of the number of processors (log2 scale). Note
that the qubits are not correlated across processors.
VII. RSA SCHEMES
In the following section we compute the space/time trade-
offs for attacking public-key cryptographic schemes based
on factoring large numbers, namely RSA-1024, RSA-2048,
RSA-3072, RSA-4096, RSA-7680 and RSA-15360. For each
scheme, we plot the space/time tradeoff points then fit it with
a third degree polynomial, for pg = 10−3 and pg = 10−5,
respectively.
A. RSA-1024
FIG. 43. RSA-1024 space/time tradeoffs with physical error rate per
gate pg = 10−3. The scale is logarithmic (base 2). Approximately
y(16.3987) ≈ 3.01 × 107 physical qubits are required to break the
scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of T gates in the circuit is
3.01×1011, the corresponding number of logical qubits is 2050, and
the total number of surface code cycles is 5.86× 1013. The quantity
R2 represents the coefficient of determination (closer to 1, better the
fitting). The classical security parameter is approximately 80 bits.
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FIG. 44. RSA-1024 space/time tradeoffs with physical error rate per
gate pg = 10−5. The scale is logarithmic (base 2). Approximately
y(16.3987) ≈ 2.14 × 106 physical qubits are required to break the
scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of T gates in the circuit is
3.01×1011, the corresponding number of logical qubits is 2050, and
the total number of surface code cycles is 2.93× 1013. The classical
security parameter is approximately 80 bits.
B. RSA-2048
FIG. 45. RSA-2048 space/time tradeoffs with physical error rate per
gate pg = 10−3. The scale is logarithmic (base 2). Approximately
y(16.3987) ≈ 1.72 × 108 physical qubits are required to break the
scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of T gates in the circuit is
2.41×1012, the corresponding number of logical qubits is 4098, and
the total number of surface code cycles is 4.69× 1014. The classical
security parameter is approximately 112 bits.
FIG. 46. RSA-2048 space/time tradeoffs with physical error rate per
gate pg = 10−5. The scale is logarithmic (base 2). Approximately
y(16.3987) ≈ 9.78 × 106 physical qubits are required to break the
scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of T gates in the circuit is
2.41×1012, the corresponding number of logical qubits is 4098, and
the total number of surface code cycles is 2.35× 1014. The classical
security parameter is approximately 112 bits.
C. RSA-3072
FIG. 47. RSA-3072 space/time tradeoffs with physical error rate per
gate pg = 10−3. The scale is logarithmic (base 2). Approximately
y(16.3987) ≈ 6.41 × 108 physical qubits are required to break the
scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of T gates in the circuit is
8.12×1012, the corresponding number of logical qubits is 6146, and
the total number of surface code cycles is 1.58× 1015. The classical
security parameter is approximately 128 bits.
FIG. 48. RSA-3072 space/time tradeoffs with physical error rate per
gate pg = 10−5. The scale is logarithmic (base 2). Approximately
y(16.3987) ≈ 2.55 × 107 physical qubits are required to break the
scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of T gates in the circuit is
8.12×1012, the corresponding number of logical qubits is 6146, and
the total number of surface code cycles is 7.91× 1014. The classical
security parameter is approximately 128 bits.
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D. RSA-4096
FIG. 49. RSA-4096 space/time tradeoffs with physical error rate per
gate pg = 10−3. The scale is logarithmic (base 2). Approximately
y(16.3987) ≈ 1.18 × 109 physical qubits are required to break the
scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of T gates in the circuit is
1.92×1013, the corresponding number of logical qubits is 8194, and
the total number of surface code cycles is 3.75× 1015. The classical
security parameter is approximatively approximately 156 bits.
FIG. 50. RSA-4096 space/time tradeoffs with physical error rate per
gate pg = 10−5. The scale is logarithmic (base 2). Approximately
y(16.3987) ≈ 5.70 × 107 physical qubits are required to break the
scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of T gates in the circuit is
1.92×1013, the corresponding number of logical qubits is 8194, and
the total number of surface code cycles is 1.88× 1015. The classical
security parameter is approximatively approximately 156 bits.
E. RSA-7680
FIG. 51. RSA-7680 space/time tradeoffs with physical error rate per
gate pg = 10−3. The scale is logarithmic (base 2). Approximately
y(16.3987) ≈ 7.70× 1010 physical qubits are required to break the
scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of T gates in the circuit
is 1.27× 1014, the corresponding number of logical qubits is 15362,
and the total number of surface code cycles is 2.64 × 1016. The
classical security parameter is approximately 192 bits.
FIG. 52. RSA-7680 space/time tradeoffs with physical error rate per
gate pg = 10−5. The scale is logarithmic (base 2). Approximately
y(16.3987) ≈ 7.41 × 109 physical qubits are required to break the
scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of T gates in the circuit
is 1.27× 1014, the corresponding number of logical qubits is 15362,
and the total number of surface code cycles is 2.47 × 1016. The
classical security parameter is approximately 192 bits.
F. RSA-15360
FIG. 53. RSA-15360 space/time tradeoffs with physical error rate per
gate pg = 10−3. The scale is logarithmic (base 2). Approximately
y(16.3987) ≈ 4.85× 1012 physical qubits are required to break the
scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of T gates in the circuit
is 1.01× 1015, the corresponding number of logical qubits is 30722,
and the total number of surface code cycles is 2.24 × 1017. The
classical security parameter is approximately 256 bits.
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FIG. 54. RSA-15360 space/time tradeoffs with physical error rate per
gate pg = 10−5. The scale is logarithmic (base 2). Approximately
y(16.3987) ≈ 7.64× 1010 physical qubits are required to break the
scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of T gates in the circuit
is 1.01× 1015, the corresponding number of logical qubits is 30722,
and the total number of surface code cycles is 1.98 × 1017. The
classical security parameter is approximately 256 bits.
VIII. ELLIPTIC CURVE SCHEMES
In the following section we compute the space/time trade-
offs for attacking public-key cryptographic schemes based on
solving the discrete logarithm problem in finite groups gen-
erated over elliptic curves, namely NIST P-160, NIST P-
192, NIST P-224, NIST P-256, NIST P-384 and NIST P-
521. For each scheme, we plot the space/time tradeoff points
then fit it with a third degree polynomial, for pg = 10−3
and pg = 10−5, respectively. We used the logical circuits
from [14].
A. NIST P-160
FIG. 55. NIST P-160 elliptic curve space/time tradeoffs with phys-
ical error rate per gate pg = 10−3. The scale is logarithmic (base
2). Approximately y(16.3987) ≈ 1.81 × 107 physical qubits are
required to break the scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of
T gates in the circuit is 2.08 × 1011, the corresponding number of
logical qubits is 1466, and the total number of surface code cycles is
4.05× 1013. The classical security parameter is 80 bits.
FIG. 56. NIST P-160 elliptic curve space/time tradeoffs with phys-
ical error rate per gate pg = 10−5. The scale is logarithmic (base
2). Approximately y(16.3987) ≈ 1.38 × 106 physical qubits are
required to break the scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of
T gates in the circuit is 2.08 × 1011, the corresponding number of
logical qubits is 1466, and the total number of surface code cycles is
2.03× 1013. The classical security parameter is 80 bits.
B. NIST P-192
FIG. 57. NIST P-192 space/time tradeoffs with physical error rate
per gate pg = 10−3. The scale is logarithmic (base 2). Approx-
imately y(16.3987) ≈ 3.37 × 107 physical qubits are required to
break the scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of T gates in
the circuit is 3.71×1011, the corresponding number of logical qubits
is 1754, and the total number of surface code cycles is 7.23× 1013.
The classical security parameter is 96 bits.
16
FIG. 58. NIST P-192 space/time tradeoffs with physical error rate
per gate pg = 10−5. The scale is logarithmic (base 2). Approx-
imately y(16.3987) ≈ 2.18 × 106 physical qubits are required to
break the scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of T gates in
the circuit is 3.71×1011, the corresponding number of logical qubits
is 1754, and the total number of surface code cycles is 3.62× 1013.
The classical security parameter is 96 bits.
C. NIST P-224
FIG. 59. NIST P-224 elliptic curve space/time tradeoffs with phys-
ical error rate per gate pg = 10−3. The scale is logarithmic (base
2). Approximately y(16.3987) ≈ 4.91 × 107 physical qubits are
required to break the scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of
T gates in the circuit is 5.90 × 1011, the corresponding number of
logical qubits is 2042, and the total number of surface code cycles is
1.15× 1014. The classical security parameter is 112 bits.
FIG. 60. NIST P-224 elliptic curve space/time tradeoffs with phys-
ical error rate per gate pg = 10−5. The scale is logarithmic (base
2). Approximately y(16.3987) ≈ 3.24 × 106 physical qubits are
required to break the scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of
T gates in the circuit is 5.90 × 1011, the corresponding number of
logical qubits is 2042, and the total number of surface code cycles is
5.75× 1013. The classical security parameter is 112 bits.
D. NIST P-256
FIG. 61. NIST P-256 elliptic curve space/time tradeoffs with phys-
ical error rate per gate pg = 10−3. The scale is logarithmic (base
2). Approximately y(16.3987) ≈ 6.77 × 107 physical qubits are
required to break the scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of
T gates in the circuit is 8.82 × 1011, the corresponding number of
logical qubits is 2330, and the total number of surface code cycles is
1.72× 1014. The classical security parameter is 128 bits.
FIG. 62. NIST P-256 elliptic curve space/time tradeoffs with phys-
ical error rate per gate pg = 10−5. The scale is logarithmic (base
2). Approximately y(16.3987) ≈ 4.64 × 106 physical qubits are
required to break the scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of
T gates in the circuit is 8.82 × 1011, the corresponding number of
logical qubits is 2330, and the total number of surface code cycles is
8.60× 1013. The classical security parameter is 128 bits.
E. NIST P-384
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FIG. 63. NIST P-384 elliptic curve space/time tradeoffs with phys-
ical error rate per gate pg = 10−3. The scale is logarithmic (base
2). Approximately y(16.3987) ≈ 2.27 × 108 physical qubits are
required to break the scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of
T gates in the circuit is 3.16 × 1012, the corresponding number of
logical qubits is 3484, and the total number of surface code cycles is
6.17× 1014. The classical security parameter is 192 bits.
FIG. 64. NIST P-384 elliptic curve space/time tradeoffs with phys-
ical error rate per gate pg = 10−5. The scale is logarithmic (base
2). Approximately y(16.3987) ≈ 1.28 × 107 physical qubits are
required to break the scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of
T gates in the circuit is 3.16 × 1012, the corresponding number of
logical qubits is 3484, and the total number of surface code cycles is
3.08× 1014. The classical security parameter is 192 bits.
F. NIST P-521
FIG. 65. NIST P-521 elliptic curve space/time tradeoffs with phys-
ical error rate per gate pg = 10−3. The scale is logarithmic (base
2). Approximately y(16.3987) ≈ 6.06 × 108 physical qubits are
required to break the scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of
T gates in the circuit is 7.98 × 1012, the corresponding number of
logical qubits is 4719, and the total number of surface code cycles is
1.56× 1015. The classical security parameter is 256 bits.
FIG. 66. NIST P-521 elliptic curve space/time tradeoffs with phys-
ical error rate per gate pg = 10−5. The scale is logarithmic (base
2). Approximately y(16.3987) ≈ 2.30 × 107 physical qubits are
required to break the scheme in one day (24 hours). The number of
T gates in the circuit is 7.98 × 1012, the corresponding number of
logical qubits is 4719, and the total number of surface code cycles is
7.78× 1014. The classical security parameter is 256 bits.
IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We analyzed the security of several widely used symmet-
ric ciphers and hash functions against parallelized quantum
adversaries. We computed the security parameter, wall-time
and physical footprint for each cryptographic primitive. Our
attack model was based on a brute force searching via a par-
allelized version of Grover’s algorithm, assuming a surface-
code fault-tolerant architecture based on defects and braiding
techniques.
It is worth noting that throughout we are assuming that
brute-force search where we treat the cryptographic function
as a black-box is essentially the optimal attack against SHA
and AES, which is currently believed to be the case.
Some symmetric key algorithms are susceptible in a model
that permits “superposition attacks” [22]. In most realistic in-
stances, these attacks are not practical, however they do shed
light on the limitations of certain security proof methods in
a quantum context, and remind us that we shouldn’t take for
granted that non-trivial attacks on symmetric key cryptogra-
phy may be possible. For example, very recently, there have
been several cryptanalysis results [23] and [24] that attempt to
reduce breaking some symmetric algorithms to solving a sys-
tem of non-linear equations. Solving these non-linear equa-
tions is then attacked using a modified version of the quantum
linear equation solver algorithm [25]. The results are heavily
dependent on the condition number of the non-linear system,
which turns to be hard to compute (it is not known for most
ciphers and hash functions such as AES or SHA). Provided
the condition number is relatively small, then one may get an
advantage compared to brute-force Grover search. However
at this time it is not clear whether this is indeed the case, and
we do not have large-scale quantum computers to experiment
with.
The quantum security parameter (based on our assumptions
of using state-of-the-art algorithms and fault-tolerance meth-
ods) for symmetric and hash-based cryptographic schemes
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is summarized in Table I. For more details about space/time
tradeoffs achievable via parallelization of Grover’s algorithm
please see the corresponding Sec. III, Sec. IV and Sec. V, re-
spectively.
Name qs
AES-128 106
AES-192 139
AES-256 172
SHA-256 166
SHA3-256 167
Bitcoin’s PoW 75
TABLE I. Quantum security parameter (qs) for the AES family of
ciphers, SHA family of hash functions, and Bitcoin, assuming a con-
servative physical error rate per gate pg = 10−4.
We also analyzed the security of asymmetric (public-key)
cryptography, in particular RSA and ECC, in the light of new
improvements in fault-tolerant quantum error correction based
on surface code lattice surgery techniques. We computed the
space/time tradeoff required to attack every scheme, using
physical error rates of 10−3 and 10−5, respectively. We fit-
ted the data with a third degree polynomial, which resulted
in an analytical formula of the number of qubits required to
break the scheme as a function of time.
The total number of physical qubits required to break the
RSA schemes in 24 hours, together with the required number
of T gates, corresponding number of surface code cycles and
corresponding classical security parameter is summarized in
Table II. For more details about possible space/time tradeoffs
please see the corresponding Section VII of the manuscript.
The total number of physical qubits required to break the
ECC schemes in 24 hours, together with the required num-
ber of T gates, corresponding number of surface code cy-
cles and corresponding classical security parameter is sum-
marized in in Table III. For more details about possible
space/time tradeoffs please see the corresponding Section VIII
of the manuscript. As observed before in [14], breaking
RSA schemes demands more quantum resources in compar-
ison with elliptic curve-based schemes, for the same level of
Name nq Tc scc s
RSA-1024 3.01× 107 3.01× 1011 5.86× 1013 80
RSA-2048 1.72× 108 2.41× 1012 4.69× 1014 112
RSA-3072 6.41× 108 8.12× 1012 1.58× 1015 128
RSA-4096 1.18× 109 1.92× 1013 3.75× 1015 156
RSA-7680 7.70× 1010 1.27× 1014 2.64× 1016 192
RSA-15360 4.85× 1012 1.01× 1015 2.24× 1017 256
TABLE II. The total physical footprint (nq) required to break the
RSA schemes in 24 hours, together with the required number of T
gates (Tc), the corresponding number of surface code cycles (scc),
and the corresponding classical security parameter (s). We assume a
very conservative physical error rate per gate pg = 10−3, more likely
to be achievable by the first generations of fault-tolerant quantum
computers.
Name nq Tc scc s
P-160 1.81× 107 2.08× 1011 4.05× 1013 80
P-192 3.37× 107 3.71× 1011 7.23× 1013 96
P-224 4.91× 107 5.90× 1011 1.15× 1014 112
P-256 6.77× 107 8.82× 1011 1.72× 1014 128
P-384 2.27× 108 3.16× 1012 6.17× 1014 192
P-521 6.06× 108 7.92× 1012 1.56× 1015 260
TABLE III. The total physical footprint (nq) required to break the
ECC schemes in 24 hours, together with the required number of T
gates (Tc), the corresponding number of surface code cycles (scc),
and the corresponding classical security parameter (s). We assume a
very conservative physical error rate per gate pg = 10−3, more likely
to be achievable by the first generations of fault-tolerant quantum
computers.
classical security.
Recent developments in the theory of fault-tolerant quan-
tum error correction have great impact on evaluating the ef-
fective strength of cryptographic schemes against quantum at-
tacks, as the fault-tolerant layer of a quantum computation is
the most resource-intensive part of running a quantum algo-
rithm. Therefore, monitoring the advances in the theory of
quantum error correction is of crucial importance when esti-
mating the strength (or weakness) of a cryptographic scheme
against a quantum adversary. This work serves as a bench-
mark against which the impact of future advances can be com-
pared.
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